This book deals with a central problem throughout the legal profession - 'What is the nature of discovery in legal decision-making?' It begins by identifying fundamental problems about the nature of discovery, expression and introspection that emerge in the work of legal theorists and psychologists who have a reflective interest in the discovery process. Related problems are raised in analyses of the spontaneous efforts of an arbitrator and a judge to solve legal problems. The work of the Canadian philosopher and theologian, Bernard Lonergan, on 'insight' in non-legal fields is brought to bear on the problem. A plausible interpretation of various facets of discovery is provided. In face, the author offers a new context in which to examine discovery, expression, and justification. This is the first book to focus primarily on the discovery process in legal reasoning. It is essential reading for anyone - legal theorists, philosophers, psychologists, judges, lawyers and students - interested in legal reasoning.